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THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER. By David Mellinkoff,t St. Paul,
Minnesota: West Publishing Co. 1973. Pp. x, 304. $6.50. Reviewed by
Eugene J. Davidson.tt
"[C] onscience is the guardian in the individual of the rules which the
community has evolved for its own preservation."-Maugham'
"[P] olicy sits above conscience . . . ."-Shakespeare2
Maugham or Shakespeare-Shakespeare or Maugham; which is it to
be? Is it to be winning or how the game is played? Is it more important
to re-elect the incumbent President or shall the former Attorney
General of the United States disclose the "Watergate Horrors?"
For many conscience versus policy never becomes a serious problem.
Most will go through life making ad hoc decisions of policy over
conscience or vice versa with hardly an awareness that the decision was
made. However, lawyers, particularly criminal trial lawyers, are not so
fortunate. Frequently they are confronted with the hard choice. For
them it may be more than how the game is played, since a client's
property, freedom or, perhaps, life itself is at stake.
Do the rules evolved by society permit lawyers not only to defend a
self-confessed felon but to use their every skill and resource to persuade
the jury to acquit a known to be guilty defendant. Our morality and
our legal system dictate granting the guilty a fair trial. We take pride in
declaring that better one hundred guilty go free than one innocent
person be convicted. However, as Professor Elliott E. Cheatham
observed:
For the layman, it is never easy to understand, much less to
sympathize with, the adversary system for the administration of
justice. ... It troubles the sensitive man entering the profession.
He understands why the soldier should fight his nation's enemy,
or why the physician should fight disease, the common enemy
of mankind. But what is the justification of the lawyer, "an
officer of the court," fighting for what is not just?3
One would suppose that by the last quarter of the twentieth century
a well delineated mode of conduct for defending the admitted felon
would have evolved, so that all would know precisely what is prescribed
and what is proscribed. Yet, even today the problem remains a
dilemma. Judicial decisions, The Code of Professional Responsibility
and the writings of eminent authorities are ambivalent.
The United States Supreme Court admonishes defense counsel to be
t Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles, California.

tt Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law.
1. W.

MAUGHAM,

2. W.

SHAKESPEARE, TIMON OF ATHENS

THE MOON

AND SIXPENCE

79 (Heritage Press ed. 1941).

act 3, scene 2, line 94.

3. Cheatham, The Lawyer's Role and Surroundings, 25 ROCKY
(1953).

MT.

L.

REV.

405, 409-10

Book Reviews

17931

an advocate and not amicus;4 a Federal Judge proclaims the defendant
to be "entitled to the faithful and devoted services of his attorney
uninhibited by the [attorney's] dictating conscience;"' and a legal
commentator writes, "A trial is not a dispassionate and cobperative
effort by all the parties to arrive at justice .... [T] he adversary system
for the administration of justice ...involve[s] ... the deliberate
reliance on partisan representation.... 6
Can defense counsel be a partisan advocate divorced from his
conscience and still true to his pledge "not [to] counsel or
maintain ... any defense except such as I believe to be honestly
debatable under the law of the land ...[to] employ for the purpose of
maintaining the causes confided to me such means only as are consistent with truth and honor?" 7
It is on this seeming conflict that The Conscience of a Lawyer
focuses attention. The framework for the author's exploration into the
moral and ethical problems confronting defense counsel is the
celebrated Victorian trial of Benjamin F. Courvoisier for the murder of
his employer, Lord William Russell.
As related by Mellinkoff, the investigation of the crime and the trial
make fascinating reading. It contains all of the drama, suspense, and
surprise of a television mystery as well as the moral overtones of a
daytime television soap opera. The cast of charaters run the gamut: a
bumbling and evasive constable who is capable of perjury; a frightened
servant girl who may be the murderess; a mystery witness whose
morality and credibility are suspect and who comes forward just as the
prosecution's case appears to be crumbling; and, of course, the
defendant himself, a Swiss domiciliary who stands accused of
murdering his employer, an English nobleman. Add to this potpourri a
public aroused by an attempt only a week before on the life of young
Queen Victoria and a press that determined the defendant Courvoisier
guilty even before the first witness was heard. Clearly the lot of defense
counsel was not to be an easy one. It became almost intolerable when
the defendant on the second day of the trial quietly told counsel, "I
committed the murder;"' that he would not plead guilty and expected
counsel "to defend me to the utmost." 9
The book is not merely a tale of a lawyer's trials and tribulations; it
is an inquiry into important, albeit difficult, issues that have and will
continue to plague the legal profession.
Using the story teller's art (an art in which the author evidences great
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talents) and the technique of narrative instruction (which as Theordore
White has suggested is the best kind of instruction), Mellinkoff explores
the ethical problems confronting counsel in continuing with the
defense. Should he withdraw or should he continue with the case? If he
remains, how vigorous may his defense be? May his cross-examination
seek to destroy the credibility of the police and to cast suspicion on an
innocent servant girl? How far may he go in proclaiming his client's
innocence during summation to the jury? In short, does he act as
though he was not the repository of his client's secret or does he seek
an accomodation between justice and his client's desire of an
",utmost"' 0 defense?
These problems, their impact on the legal profession, the role of the
press, and the public's reaction which sees the Bar as screening the
guilty and varnishing crime are explored by Mellinkoff in an absorbing
as well as scholarly fashion. He also traces the developments of
Anglo-American concepts regarding the defense of the hated and the
role of counsel as advocate and officer of the court. Mellinkoff's views
understandably shape his handling of the material. He, however, is at
his best when commenting on the manner in which the legal profession
supports those principles which would make more complete the ideal of
equality before the law. Typical is his righteous concern with a system
that enables conservative United States Supreme Court Justice George
Sutherland to state: "The right [of an accused] to be heard would be,
in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be
heard by counsel"' ' and, nevertheless, fails to mandate the Bar to
defend the same accused. The Bar and the public well may ponder
Mellinkoff's query: "If the accused is entitled to a lawyer, is the coin
blank on the other side? Or is it also 'a logical corollary' that an
American lawyer has a duty to defend? And that, regardless of what he
thinks of the man or his cause?"' 2
Lawyers speak proudly of Andrew Josiah Quincy and Arthur D. Hill
for acting in the highest tradition of the bar by undertaking to
represent the nonconformer or the hated. Yet, the modern Code of
Professional Responsibility does not obligate a lawyer, absent a court
appointment or a request by the Bar Association, to refrain from
declining to represent an accused because of the latter's identity or
counsel's belief of guilt.' ' Significantly EC 2-26 makes the unequivocal
statement: "A lawyer is under no obligation to act as adviser or
4
advocate for every person who may wish to become his client."' '
While it continues to declare that lawyers should not lightly decline
proferred employment, this admonition is tempered by the concluding
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sentence which states: "The fulfillment of this objective requires acceptance by a lawyer of his share of tendered employment which may
be unattractive both to him and the bar generally."' 5
Another of Mellinkoff's discussions worthy of reflection by lawyers
and laymen alike is the chapter To Defend a Guilty Man wherein he
points:
Some men, perhaps most, who confess ... are guilty, morally
and legally. Yet it is not invariably so. And it is some mark of a
civilized society that it will take pains to make sure before
condemning anyone. The pains ... go by the lawyer's name of
"procedure," to some by the dirty word "technicalities" (as
indeed they are). . . . Any system of justice has its procedures,
its technicalities .... It is often only a choice of procedures that
separates savagery or tyranny from civilized life. Head-hunting
is a procedure; so is the rack.' 6
Francis Bacon reminded us that "some books are to be tasted,
others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested."' "
The Conscience of a Lawyer is one of the few. It is worthy of both the
time and attention of the Bench and the Bar. For the law student the
book is, perhaps, a must. Undoubtedly all will have a clearer
understanding of the conduct of defense counsel in some of this
decade's more notorious prosecutions after reading The Conscience of a
Lawyer.
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